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Abstract
Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to nanc-
ing only ethical projects, which have social protability but lower expected revenues than standard
projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers.
The matching between SR borrowers and ethical banks reduces the frictions caused by moral
hazard. However, when the type of the borrowers is not observable, then standard borrowers have
incentives to invest in ethical projects pretending to be SR. We show that the separation of borrowers
entails costs that are paid by SR entrepreneurs but are relatively low because standard lenders o¤er
an outside option that relaxes the self-selection constraint of the borrowers.
Technically, we solve a Contract Proposal Game where informed principals (borrowers) o¤er di¤er-
ent menus of contracts to heterogeneous agents (banks). We show that market segmentation improves
e¢ ciency and solves the problem of multiplicity of equilibria in Contract Proposal Games.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of ethical banks is an expression of the growing demand for corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in the banking industry of developed countries. Quoting Bénabou and Tirole (2010, p.2), CSR is
about sacricing prots in the social interest. For there to be a sacrice, the rm must go beyond its legal
and contractual obligations, on a voluntary basis. CSR embraces a wide range of behaviors, such as being
employee friendly, environment friendly, mindful of ethics, respectful of communities where the rms
plants are located, and even investor friendly. In line with the previous denition, we interpret ethical
banks as socially responsible lenders, because they commit to fund only socially relevant projects, i.e.
ethical projects, which provide both social and economic advantages, but which deliver lower expected
revenue than standard ones. Ethical banks are not the only socially responsible agents in the credit
market of high income countries, we call motivated those borrowers that prefer to engage in socially
valuable activities as ethical projects because, by doing so, they receive a non-monetary premium for
social responsibility. Contrary to ethical banks, motivated borrowers do not commit to ethical projects
and will still invest in standard projects if their expected return is su¢ ciently higher than the one of
ethical projects.1
Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) show that the assortative matching between ethical banks and moti-
vated borrowers allows to reduce the frictions caused by moral hazard. The e¢ ciency gain can be so high
that motivated borrowers trading with ethical banks end up receiving better contract conditions than
standard borrowers trading with commercial banks. Better prospects translate in larger loans, higher
expected returns for the borrower and lower interest rates and are possible when the premium for social
responsibility is su¢ ciently high. Such a premium accrues motivated entrepreneurspayo¤s when they
undertake an ethical project nanced by an ethical bank and the project turns out to be successful.
Importantly, the surplus arising from the matching between agents caring about social issues implies that
socially responsible banks, despite the fact of sacricing prots on a voluntary basis, can survive in the
long run as well as traditional lenders. Some recent empirical studies focusing on ethical banks (Becchetti
et al. 2011; Becchetti and Garcia 2011; Cornée and Szafarz 2012) are in line with the previous results:
ethical banks authorize larger loans than commercial banks, and borrowers nanced by ethical banks,
having controlled for borrowerscharacteristics, are charged a lower interest rate.
In our previous paper we investigate how socially responsible lenders and motivated borrowers in-
teract with each other when they participate in a credit market where standard lenders and borrowers
also operate and moral hazard is the unique market failure, meaning that both borrowers and lenders
characteristics are common knowledge. As already mentioned, in the previous paper we proved that
motivated borrowers can obtain better credit conditions than other borrowers if the premium for social
responsibility is su¢ ciently high.
Suppose, now, that borrowers motivation is private information and no credible commitment is
1We refer the reader to Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) for the description of the typical mission of ethical banks, for real
world examples and for a discussion about ethical projects, ethical banks and motivated borrowers.
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available to entrepreneurs so that their pro-social attitude can be falsied. In particular, a borrower could
pretend to be socially responsible in order to strengthen its bargaining position. This is precisely what
happens in our framework where standard borrowers are the badtypes willing to take advantage of their
private information. In our setting, falsifying borrowersCSR is straightforward because entrepreneurs
pretending to be motivated simply have to undertake ethical projects nanced by ethical banks. This has,
however, negative implications for ethical lenders as, when a standard entrepreneur mimics a motivated
one, he/she possibly misbehaves and the lending contract is not protable anymore for the bank. The
situation we describe may occur in a market where borrowers are start-ups, or new rms lacking a
reputation and credible commitment to CSR does not exist.
To sum up, in this paper we analyze the interaction between heterogeneous borrowers and heteroge-
neous lenders in a credit market where both moral hazard and adverse selection on the borrowersside
have bite because banks are not able to observe borrowersbehavior nor they can distinguish motivated
from standard borrowers.
We show that, under moral hazard and adverse selection, the benet arising from trade between
ethical banks and motivated borrowers is partially o¤set by the information rent appropriated by standard
borrowers. In particular, the equilibrium outcome is such that standard borrowers sign with commercial
banks the same contract as under moral hazard only; whereas motivated borrowers trading with ethical
banks preserve their higher borrowing capacity but loose the benet of better contract conditions. In
di¤erent words, motivated borrowers pay the cost of separation by accepting contractual terms that
do not appeal to a standard entrepreneur. Moreover, as under moral hazard only, the market is fully
segmented, meaning that standard agents trade among themselves in the market for standard projects
while ethical banks trade with motivated borrowers in the market for ethical projects.
Turning to the modeling strategy, we study a model where borrowers are the informed party proposing
contracts to lenders. Moreover, as it will be better argued in Subsection 4.1, the type of borrowers a¤ects
the ethical banks prots, through the solution of the moral hazard problem, making our model a common
value one. We are thus in a framework with informed principals and common values and, borrow from
the seminal paper by Maskin and Tirole (1992).
In Maskin and Tirole (1992), heterogeneous principals propose one single menu of contracts to un-
informed and uniform agents and a key-concept in the paper is the Rothschild-Stliglitz-Wilson (RSW)
allocation (with homogeneous agents). Such allocation indicates the menu of incentive compatible con-
tracts that are protable type-by-type and allow separation at the lowest cost.2 Conversely, in our
model heterogeneous principals (borrowers) propose contracts to uninformed and heterogeneous agents
(lenders). The important di¤erence is that, in our Contract Proposal Game, informed principals o¤er two
2Maskin and Tirole (1992) name the RSW allocation, where the incentive-compatible contracts are protable type-by-
type, after the inuential papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). As we will further discuss in the
paper, informed principals can always guarantee themselves the payo¤ reached with the RSW allocation which is the unique
equilibrium when it is interim e¢ cient. When it is not, then multiplicity of equilibria arises in the contract proposal game.
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menus (one for each type of agents), instead of only one.3 We show that all contracts in the two menus
break-even type-by-type and that the menu for ethical lenders contains the RSW allocation with market
segmentation (see below). Instead, the menu for standard lenders always contains a pooling contract,
since for standard lenders the two types of borrowers are equivalent, as it will be clear in what follows.4
Once each type of agents (lenders) has accepted the menu designed for it, each informed principal (bor-
rower) selects the preferred option among the contracts available in the two menus. More specically,
each borrower picks the overall preferred contract from one menu and the null contract from the other
menu. We rst show that the presence of heterogeneous lenders and the fact of o¤ering them two di¤erent
menus lead to a substantial improvement in the e¢ ciency of the equilibrium allocation and guarantees its
uniqueness. Finally, we show that a su¢ cient condition for the unique equilibrium outcome to be interim
e¢ cient is that the share of motivated borrowers in the population of investors is lower than 50%.
As for e¢ ciency, the cost of separation would be higher if ethical banks were the unique type of lenders
in the credit market. Intuitively, in the RSW allocation with market segmentation contained in the menu
for ethical banks, borrowers take into account that trading with standard lenders represents an outside-
option that relaxes the self-selection constraint and helps preventing standard borrowers from mimicking
motivated entrepreneurs. We thus conclude that the RSW allocation with market segmentation Pareto-
dominates the RSW allocation with homogeneous lenders. Moreover, in the model with homogeneous
agents, the RSW allocation is always an equilibrium. In our setting with heterogeneous agents, instead,
the equilibrium delivers market segmentation and the RSW allocation with market segmentation is not
an equilibrium outcome5 . Indeed, only motivated borrowers pick the contract contained in the RSW
allocation inside the menu for ethical banks, whereas standard borrowers pick the contract appearing in
the menu o¤ered to standard lenders. Hence, the RSW allocation with market segmentation contains a
latent contract.
As for uniqueness, the existence of two menus designed for the two types of lenders and the fact that
cross-subsidies between di¤erent menus are impossible (meaning that transfers between di¤erent lenders
are not feasible6), imply that the uniqueness issue is fully solved. Only cross-subsidies inside the menu
for ethical banks make sense in our setting. To prove uniqueness we thus show that, in the menu for
ethical banks, it is impossible to design separating contracts with cross-subsidies that Pareto dominate
the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation. Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium outcome
with market segmentation is necessarily unique. Finally, we study the e¢ ciency properties of the unique
3Each menu also contains the null contract which works as an exit optionand allow for market segmentation.
4 In particular, the menu o¤ered to ethical banks contains two self-selecting contracts and the null one. The menu for
standard lenders contains, instead, a pooling contract together with the null one.
5We thus distinguish between the RSW allocation with market segmentation and the equilibrium allocation with market
segmentation. The latter contains only one contract from the RSW allocation with market segmentation (the one designed
for motivated borrowers).
6With cross-subsidies among banks, the menu designed for the standard bank would contain a pooling contract letting
the bank earn negative prots to be covered with positive prots earned by the ethical bank in the other menu. But, in the
second stage of the Contract Proposal Game, the standard lender would not accept a menu entailing negative prots.
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equilibrium outcome and nd a su¢ cient condition such that the latter is interim e¢ cient (meaning that,
in the hypothetical case where transfers between di¤erent menus were feasible, no dominating contracts
with cross-subsidies would exist). More specically, a su¢ cient condition for the equilibrium with market
segmentation to be interim e¢ cient is that the share of motivated borrowers in the population of potential
borrowers is less than 50%.
To sum up, our results show that the existence of heterogeneous agents receiving di¤erent menus
and the fact that transfers between the di¤erent menus are not feasible, improve e¢ ciency and solve the
problem of multiplicity of equilibria in games with informed principals.
Our paper is related to the small literature on CSR in the credit market of high-income countries.
Few works, mainly in the business literature, analyze ethical banks and show the relevant role of ethical
banking as an independent activity (e.g., Green 1989; Lynch, 1991; San-Jose et al., 2009).
From the point of view of the modelling strategy, the setting we study borrows from Tirole (2006).
The paper is also related to the models dealing with signaling and informed principals in the credit market
that are superbly reviewed in the same book (Tirole 2006, chapter 6). In those studies, good borrowers
try to signal attractive prospects to investors by introducing distortions that are costly to them but would
be even costlier to bad borrowers; the informed party can act as a principal by proposing the contract
(as in our model) or can accept the contract o¤ered by the uninformed party.7 Notable and more recent
examples of this kind of literature are Henessy et al. (2010), Cestone et al. (2014) and Bouvard (2014),
all dealing with problems not closely related with ours.
Even if the idea that a rm can follow CSR to strengthen its market position is not new (see the
excellent review on the economics of CSR by Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012), to the best of our
knowledge our paper is the rst studying a situation where no available commitment to CSR exists such
that a borrower can falsify its interest for social issues.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model set-up and the payo¤s of socially
responsible lenders and motivated borrowers. In Section 3, we show how the matching between socially
responsible agents relaxes the incentive compatible constraint of motivated borrowers and we briey
report results from Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) about the characterization of loan agreements o¤ered
in the credit market under moral-hazard only. Section 4 solves the model with both moral-hazard and
adverse selection. More specically, Subsection 4.1 denes the RSW allocation with market segmentation,
shows the e¢ ciency gain it entails and characterizes the equilibrium outcome when both moral-hazard
7Leland and Pyle (1977) is the rst application of signaling in nance; they show how a risk-averse owner can signal
the underlying quality of its rm in an initial public o¤ering (IPO) by retaining a substantial undiversied stake in the
rm. Bhattacharya (1979) investigate signaling through dividends. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that, when the rm has
private information about the value of its assets, the decision to rise new capital can be used as a signaling devise. Among
others, Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985) and (1987), Chan and Kanatas (1985) study the possibility of signaling
by pledging collateral. In Diamond (1991), a borrower enters into a short-term borrowing contract in order to signal her
creditworthiness. Welch (1989), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) have extended the Leland and Pyles theory by modeling low
IPO price as a signal of the quality of the undertaken project.
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and adverse selection have bite. Subsection 4.2 deals with uniqueness and investigates e¢ ciency. The
papers Conclusion follows.
2 Model Set-up
The model is borrowed from Tirole (2006) and has been illustrated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015). Here
we briey present the models setup and refer the reader to the mentioned paper for a detailed discussion
of the assumptions about motivated borrowers, ethical banks and ethical projects and for some real world
examples.
We consider a credit market with a large number of both risk-neutral borrowers (she) and banks (it).
Borrowers undertake a project that requires an investment. Each borrower can apply for at most one
loan, and di¤erent types of projects exist. We call Ik the endogenous amount of the investment, where
k 2 f0; 1g indicates the type of project. When k = 1 the project is ethical, and when k = 0 the project
is non-ethicalor standard. The di¤erence between the two projects is specied below.
All the borrowers own the same asset A. The borrowers do not have su¢ cient capital and/or collateral
no matter which project they are interested in, and hence need to borrow Ik   A. If the project is
undertaken, it generates a cash ow per unit of investment, which is Rk > 0 if successful and zero in the
case of failure.8 The total cash ow if the project is successful is Rk  Ik  0.
Ethical projects represent all projects leading to social benets beyond prots (for example, projects
that improve communities and have a positive impact on the environment). The protability of ethical
projects is on average lower than that of standard ones. In particular, standard projects have a higher
return in the event of success, that is: R0  R1 > 0. Both types of projects are perfectly observable and
have independent distributions.
To summarize, two sectors exist in the credit market: the market for ethical projects and the market
for standard ones. The latter assures higher expected returns to investors.
All projects are subject to moral hazard: entrepreneurs can behave or misbehave. If they behave, the
probability of success is pH ; otherwise it is pL, with pH > pL. We dene p  pH   pL. An entrepreneur
who misbehaves will enjoy a private benet whose value is P  I. Otherwise, the private benet will be
nought. We call a 2 f0; 1g the behavior of the entrepreneur. In particular, a = 0 if the entrepreneur
misbehaves, while a = 1 if she behaves. Thus, p (1) = pH and p (0) = pL, respectively. The borrowers are
protected by limited liability: hence their income cannot be negative. Given limited liability, the moral
hazard problem is relevant even though both agents are risk neutral.
There are also two types of banks and entrepreneurs, respectively denoted as i 2 f0; 1g and j 2 f0; 1g.
For both lenders and borrowers type 0 denotes the standard agents, whereas type 1 indicates socially
responsible agents.
In case of success, revenues are shared between lenders and borrowers: Lkij and B
k
ij are, respectively,
8This is without generality loss because we proved that the optimal contract is a debt one.
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the incomes of a lender of type i and that of a borrower of type j when trading with each other, if the
investment is of type k, hence obtaining: Lkij +B
k
ij = R
k  I.
In the following sections, we characterize the optimal contracts (Bkij ; I
k
ij) that specify the type of
project, the amount invested, and how revenues are shared between lenders and borrowers in the case of
success given the type of agents trading together.
The crucial ingredients of our model are the premium for social responsibility  and the premium for
successful interaction : The premium for social responsibility is a non-pecuniary benet with monetary
value  that a motivated borrower obtains when undertaking an ethical project, no matter the projects
outcome and whatever the type of lender. The additional premium for successful interaction  is the
extra premium of social responsibility accrued by a motivated agent when implementing an ethical project
nanced by an ethical bank. In fact, the motivated borrower anticipates that, if the ethical bank makes
prots, given its commitment to investing in ethical projects, it will use the liquidity to nance other
social and solidarity-based projects, increasing expected utility of the motivated borrower.
The entrepreneurspayo¤ can be written as:
Ukij = p (a)
 
Bkij + ijk

+ jk  A+ (1  a)PIkij (1)
Note that the premium for social responsibility  is positive only if a motivated borrower invests in
an ethical project (j = k = 1) ; whereas the premium for successful interaction  is positive only if a
motivated borrower invests in an ethical project with an ethical bank (i = j = k = 1) and the project
succeeds.
Standard lenders maximize their prots. When the moral hazard problem is taken care of, expected
prots become:
pHL
k
0j   Ik0j +A (2)
We assume that ethical banks maximize expected prots9 , as do standard lenders, but commit to
investing only in ethical projects (therefore k = 1): Because ethical projects have a lower protability
than standard ones, commitment to ethical projects implies that ethical banks are sacricing prots for
the social interest.10 Subscript j in (3) indicates that both standard and motivated borrowers can invest
with ethical banks:
pHL
1
1j   I11j +A: (3)
As already mentioned, borrowers are endowed with all the bargaining power and propose a contract to
lenders so that the banksexpected prots are zero at the equilibrium.11 The sequence of actions is thus
as follows: the borrower o¤ers the contract, then the lender accepts or refuses the proposal. Subsequently,
the borrower decides whether to behave or misbehave, uncertainty concerning the project is solved, and
the contract is implemented.
9One can show that nothing changes when assuming that ethical banks maximize total revenue from ethical projects.
10Commitment to ethical projects is possible because borrowers have all the market power and propose contracts, in the
form of a specic and observable project for funding, to banks which can accept or reject them.
11This is equivalent to assuming Bertrand competition among lenders.
7
3 Second-best: Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard
The setting with moral hazard only is investigated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015). Here we summarize
their main results because they represent the starting point of the analysis of moral hazard and adverse
selection which is the focus of the present paper.
Assume that the project and the borrower type are common knowledge, while borrowers have private
information on their behavior, which may or may not increase the probability of success of the project.
The optimal contract hence maximizes the borrowers utility under the borrowers incentive compatibility
constraint
 
ICBkij

and the lendersparticipation constraint
 
IRLkij

(see Appendix 6.1).
One can show that standard borrowers optimally sign a contract with a standard bank for a standard
project. Motivated borrowers, instead, at equilibrium can either sign the same contract (because all
borrowers are the same when investing in standard projects) or they can invest in an ethical project
with an ethical bank. The third option of motivated borrowers, i.e. investing in an ethical project
with a standard bank, is discarded because always dominated. In fact, when trading with an ethical
bank, motivated borrowers may also receive the premium for successful interaction, . Moreover, the
matching of motivated borrowers with ethical lenders reduces the frictions caused by the agency issue, as
we briey explain below, allowing for the possibility of better contract conditions, and this despite the
lower protability of ethical projects.
To see why ethical banks are more e¢ cient than standard lenders in solving the moral hazard problem
of the motivated borrower, let us consider the incentive compatibility constraint of a motivated borrower
trading with an ethical bank:
B111 + 
PI111
p
(ICB11)
The left-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint includes all the gains obtained by the borrower
when a project is successful: an increase in revenues, B111, and an increase in psychological well-being,
. The latter is what makes the incentive compatibility constraint in such a case distinctive, in fact
this term appears neither in the incentive compatibility constraint of a standard borrower nor in the
incentive compatibility constraint of a motivated borrower when investing in an ethical project with a
standard bank. Hence, we conclude that the matching of motivated borrowers and ethical lenders relaxes
the incentive constraint of the borrowers.
The market structure at equilibrium depends on the motivated borrowers choice of investing in a
standard project with a standard bank or of investing in an ethical project with an ethical bank. The
following proposition from Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015) describes the equilibrium in the credit market
under moral hazard. The analytical expressions for the terms appearing in the two optimal contracts
(B000 ; I
0
00 ) and (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) and the three threshold values ;  and  for the premium for successful
interactions are illustrated in Appendix 6.1.
Proposition 1 Second-best (From Barigozzi and Tedeschi 2015). When moral hazard is the unique
asymmetric information characterizing the credit market, three threshold values for the premium for
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successful interactions,  >     0; exist such that:
 when   , then the credit market is fully segmented and contracts (B000 ; I000 ) and (B111 ; I111 )
are signed by standard and motivated borrowers respectively.
1. If   , the contracts are such that I111 > I000 and B111 > B000 :
2. If     , the contracts are such that: I111 > I000 and B111 < B000 :
3. If 

<   , the contracts are such that: I111 < I000 and B111 < B000 :
 When 0   < , then ethical banks are not active and there is no market for ethical projects:
all borrowers invest in standard projects and choose the contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ).
To sum up, only socially motivated borrowers potentially engage in ethical projects. If they do
not, then ethical banks cannot operate, and the market for ethical projects does not exist. If, instead,
motivated borrowers undertake ethical projects, then ethical banks are active and the market is fully
segmented. That is, standard agents trade among themselves in the market for standard projects while
ethical banks trade with motivated borrowers in the market for ethical projects. This occurs when the
premium for successful interaction is su¢ ciently high (  ). For larger values of the successful
interaction premium (  ), not only are ethical banks active, but they even provide greater funding
to motivated borrowers than what is received by standard borrowers from standard banks. Finally, when
the premium increases even further (  ), ethical banks surprisingly guarantee greater revenue
to motivated borrowers than what standard borrowers can obtain. In the latter scenario, motivated
borrowers trading with ethical banks unambiguously receive better contract conditions.
4 Third-best: Loan Agreements under Moral Hazard and Ad-
verse Selection
Now lenders cannot observe neither the borrowersbehavior nor their motivation, whereas lendersCSR
is still common knowledge, together with the fraction of motivated borrowers in the credit market (q). As
already mentioned, this setting ts a situation where lenders are banks with well known characteristics,
while borrowers are new rms without reputation. As illustrated in Proposition 1, this environment is
interesting since, when the premium for successful interaction is su¢ ciently high, motivated borrowers
trading with ethical banks obtain better contract conditions than standard borrowers trading with stan-
dard lenders. Thus, standard borrowers could take advantage of their private information by investing
in ethical projects and pretending to be motivated. In this latter case ethical banks may obtain nega-
tive prots, since standard borrowers mimicking motivated ones possibly misbehave. In di¤erent words,
the second-best contract for motivated borrowers, (B111 ; I
1
11 ), is not necessarily incentive compatible for
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standard borrowers. In the following, we study the third-best of the model, i.e. we derive the separat-
ing allocation allowing to distinguish di¤erent borrowers, we study the distortion it entails and prove
uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome.12
4.1 The RSW allocation with market segmentation
Recall that borrowers have all the market power and propose contracts to banks. Since borrowers are
the informed party, we are considering here a case of contract design by an informed principal and the
equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The seminal paper on this topic is Maskin and Tirole
(1992), whose results have been adapted to the case of competition in a credit market with two types of
borrowers and homogeneous lenders in Section 6.4 of Tirole (2006). In that model two types of informed
borrowers and many homogeneous lenders interact in the market. As mentioned in the Introduction, the
RSW allocation corresponds to the separating allocation entailing the lowest cost of separation when two
self-selecting contracts that are protable type-by-type are o¤ered. Moreover, if the RSW allocation is
interim e¢ cient (i.e. it is protable also in expectation) with respect to the lenderspriors, then it is the
unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game (the formal result is stated in Corollary to Theorem 1
in Maskin and Tirole 1992).
We depart from Section 6.4 of Tirole (2006) for two reasons: rst, in our setting moral-hazard is
also an issue, second and more importantly for what follows, we are considering a credit market with
heterogeneous borrowers and heterogeneous lenders. This implies that two menus (one for each type of
lenders) will be o¤ered in equilibrium.
The three-stage timing of actions is adapted to our setting with heterogeneous agents and is the
following. In the rst stage, borrowers design a menu for standard lenders and a menu for ethical lenders
and o¤er the menus to lenders. Each menu contains three contracts at most: the null contract together
with either two separating contracts (one for each type of borrowers) or a pooling contract. In the second
stage, lenders accept the o¤er if they earn nonnegative expected prots from the contracts appearing in
the menu designed for them.13 In the third stage, each borrower picks one contract from each menu:
the contract overall preferred among all contracts appearing in the two menus and the null contract
from the dominated menu. Then borrowers decide whether to behave or misbehave. Finally, uncertainty
concerning the project is solved, and the contract is executed.
It is important to stress that each menu must be complete in the sense that it must contain (self-
selecting) contracts for the two types of borrowers, contingent on the specic type of lender. In the
second stage lenders accept the menu designed for them if, given their beliefs on the borrowers type,
their expected prots will be non-negative. The null contract appears in each menu so that each type of
12We will distinguish between the equilibrium menus o¤ered to ethical and standard banks and the equilibrium out-
come/allocation. We will prove that the menu o¤ered in equilibrium to ethical banks is not unique whereas the equilibrium
outcome is unique.
13Recall that standard lenders optimally fund standard projects because social responsibility of motivated borrowers does
not a¤ect the borrowersincentive constraint. Ethical banks, instead, commit to fund only ethical projects.
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borrower is able to trade with just one type of lender and market segmentation can occur.
Before proceeding, the following clarications are useful. When dealing with ethical lenders we are
considering a setting with common values. In fact, the borrowers type a¤ects the expected payo¤ of the
ethical bank throughout the incentive compatibility constraint of the borrower that is type dependent
(see constraint ICB11 in the previous Section). In addition, if the incentive constraint is not satised, then
the borrower misbehaves and the ethical lenders expected prots become negative. On the contrary, the
type of the borrower does not a¤ect the expected payo¤ of commercial banks so that the setting is about
private values for those lenders.
To solve the contract proposal game we proceed as follows. We show that, in third-best, the second-
best contracts are incentive compatible and thus are still o¤ered when  < . We then turn to the
case where    and we observe that the second-best contract (B000 ; I000 ) is the (pooling) contract
characterizing the menu o¤ered to standard banks. Then, we derive the menu of contracts that borrowers
o¤er to ethical lenders. To do so, we rst dene the RSW allocation ignoring market segmentation.
Subsequently, we dene the RSW allocation with market segmentation and we show that the latter
dominates the former.14 This allows us to conclude that the RSW allocation with market segmentation
is the allocation which characterizes the menu o¤ered to ethical lenders. The equilibrium outcome will
be given by the contracts selected by the two types of borrowers among the contracts appearing in the
two equilibrium menus.
When borrowers trade with standard lenders, separation has no meaning because all borrowers are
the same. Moreover, borrowers optimally o¤er the second-best contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ) :
Remark 1 In third-best, (i) borrowers o¤er to standard lenders a menu with the second-best (pooling)
contract and the null contract:

(B000 ; I
0
00 ); (0; 0)
	
: (ii) In equilibrium, both borrowerstypes can always
guarantee themselves the payo¤ associated with the second-best contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ).
From the previous Remark and from Proposition 1, it straightforwardly follows that, when  < ;
borrowers propose contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ) to standard lenders, and no separation is possible because ethical
banks are not active.
When instead, for   ; borrowers are confronted with ethical and standard banks, separation
with market segmentation is possible if the self-selection constraints of the two types of borrowers are
satised. Obviously, if second-best contracts (B000 ; I
0
00 ) and (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) verify such constraints, then those
contracts will be proposed in third-best as well.
From Proposition 1 we know that motivated borrowers prefer contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) to contract (B
0
00 ;
I000 ) when   ; so that contract (B000 ; I000 ) is envy free. Moreover, standard borrowers prefer contract
14As it will be claried below, in the RSW allocation with market segmentation, borrowers take into account that trading
with standard lenders represents an outside-option which relaxes the self-selection constraint preventing standard borrowers
from mimicking motivated entrepreneurs.
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(B000 ; I
0
00 ) to contract (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) when  <  since, with the former, they receive a higher expected
utility than with the latter. In fact, for   ; B000 > B111 holds so that:
pHB
0
00  A > pHB111  A: (4)
The previous reasoning implies that, when 

  < , the credit market is fully segmented and
the second-best contracts (B000 ; I
0
00 ) and (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) satisfy the borrowersself-selection constraints. Here,
the separation of borrowerstypes occurs without additional agency costs, i.e. the unique friction is the
one caused by moral hazard.
Remark 2 In third-best, when  < ; the second-best allocation illustrated in Proposition 1 is still
optimal and is implemented through the two menus:

(B110 ; I
1
10 ); (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ); (0; 0)
	
for ethical banks and
(B000 ; I
0
00 ); (0; 0)
	
for standard banks, where (B110 ; I
1
10 ) is the best contract that standard borrowers can
o¤er to ethical banks.15 .
In the third stage, when borrowers choose a contract from each menu, motivated borrowers pick
(B111 ; I
1
11 ) from the menu for ethical banks and the null contract from the other one; standard borrowers
pick (B000 ; I
0
00 ) from the menu for standard banks and the null contract from the other one. Interestingly,
the menu for ethical banks contains a latent contract, (B110 ; I
1
10 ); that will never be chosen in equilibrium
because it is dominated by (B000 ; I
0
00 ).
We consider now the most interesting case where    and the opposite of inequality (4) holds
because B000 < B
1
11 : Now both borrowerstypes prefer contract (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) so that adverse selection has
bite and the standard borrowers are the badtypes who can take advantage of their private information.
Below we describe the RSW allocation with homogeneous agents (See Tirole 2006, section 6.4) in our
setting. It corresponds to the separating contracts appearing in the menu that borrowers o¤er to ethical
banks when they ignore that the pooling contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ) o¤ered in the menu designed for standard
banks is the best available option for standard borrowers.
Denition 1 The RSW allocation with homogeneous lenders corresponds to the separating con-
tracts (B110 ; I
1
10 ) and (B^
1
11; I^
1
11) which do not take into account the menu o¤ered to standard lenders.
15The analytical expression for B110 is the following:
B110 =
P
p
A
1  pH

R1   P
p
 < B000
and is obtained solving the program of a standard borrower contracting for an ethical project with an ethical bank. It
corresponds to program (8) in Appendix 6.1 with R1 replacing R0. Obviously, contract (B110 ; I
1
10 ) is dominated by (B
0
00 ;
I000 ) because of standard projectshigher returns.
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Contract (B^111; I^
1
11) solves the following program:
max
B111;I
1
11
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 + 
P
p
I111
 
ICB11

 
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A  0  IRL11
pHB
1
10  pLB111 + PI111

SShom0=1

(RSW hom)
where the incentive constraint of motivated borrowers
 
ICB11

is satised, together with the participation
constraint of ethical banks
 
IRL11

and where B110 ; appearing in the standard borrowers self-selection
constraint

SShom0=1

; is the best contract that standard borrowers can o¤er to ethical banks.
Notice that, in the right-hand side of the self-selection constraint

SShom0=1

; standard borrowers
mimicking motivated ones misbehave (a = 0 so that the probability of a successful investment is just
pL). Indeed, when standard borrowers pick the contract designed for motivated types, their incentive
constraint is not necessarily satised because they do not receive the premium for successful interaction
. The RSW allocation ignoring market segmentation assures that standard borrowers prefer contract
(B110 ; I
1
10 ) to (B^
1
11; I^
1
11) when, by picking (B^
1
11; I^
1
11); they misbehaves (that is when (B^
1
11; I^
1
11) provides the
highest payo¤ to standard borrowers). Also note that the Weak Monotonic Prot assumption (see Tirole
2006, page 267), requiring that contract (B110 ; I
1
10 ) is protable also when signed by the good(ethical)
borrowers, is trivially veried in our setting.
In Maskin and Tirole (1992) and Tirole (2006, section 6.4), borrowers can obtain at least the payo¤
associated with a RSW allocation equivalent to the one described above. Conversely, in our setting with
heterogeneous banks, we stated in Remark 1 that borrowers can always obtain the payo¤ associated with
(B000 ; I
0
00 ): The latter contract dominates (B
1
10 ; I
1
10 ) for standard borrowers, because standard projects
have higher expected returns than ethical ones. Clearly, then, separating contracts that dominate the
RSW allocation dened above and that are still protable type-by-type do exist.
Let us now dene the RSW allocation with market segmentation.
Denition 2 The RSW allocation with market segmentation corresponds to the separating alloca-
tion (B110 ; I
1
10 ) and (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ) such that motivated borrowers anticipate that trading with standard banks
is the best-option of standard borrowers. Contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) solves the following program:
max
B111;I
1
11
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 + 
P
p
I111
 
ICB11

 
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A  0  IRL11
pHB
0
00  pLB111 + PI111

SShet0=1

(RSW het)
where the incentive constraint of the motivated borrowers
 
ICB11

is satised, together with the participation
constraint of ethical banks
 
IRL11

, and where B000 ; appearing in the standard borrowers self-selection
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constraint

SShet0=1

; is the expected payment that standard borrowers propose to standard banks in the
second-best contract. Again, (B110 ; I
1
10 ) is the best contract that standard borrowers can o¤er to ethical
banks.
Being B000 > B
1
10 ; the self-selection constraint

SShet0=1

is easier to satisfy than

SShom0=1

: Then,
contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) assures to motivated borrowers a higher payo¤ than (B^
1
11; I^
1
11) because it is derived
from a less-constrained program. In di¤erent words: the RSW allocation with market segmentation strictly
dominates the RSW allocation of Denition 1.16
Importantly, borrowers anticipate here that the best available option for standard borrowers is contract
(B000 ; I
0
00 ) and that the contract targeted to standard borrowers and appearing in the menu for ethical
banks will never be chosen in equilibrium (recall that any contract signed by ethical banks and standard
borrowers necessarily accrues lower prots than (B000 ; I
0
00 ) to the latter). Nevertheless, notice once again
that the menu o¤ered to ethical banks must be complete (that is, it must contain the null contract and
self-selecting contracts for the two types of borrowers) and feasible for the bank (that is, the bank must
earn nonnegative expected prots from the menu), otherwise the bank will not accept the menu in the
second stage. Indeed, we could substitute (B110 ; I
1
10 ) with any other contract that signed by standard or
by motivated borrowers assures non-negative prots to ethical banks.
We are now able to describe the equilibrium with market segmentation assuring the lowest payo¤ to
the borrowers. Suppose that, in the rst stage, borrowers o¤er the menu

(B110 ; I
1
10 ); (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ); (0; 0)
	
to ethical banks and the menu

(B000 ; I
0
00 ); (0; 0)
	
to standard lenders. In the second stage, each type of
lender will accept the o¤er because the menus contain contracts that are feasible (type-by-type) and thus
assure non-negative prots to the targeted bank, no matter the banks beliefs about borrowerstypes.
In the third stage, borrowers will pick their preferred contract from each menu: standard borrowers will
chose (B000 ; I
0
00 ); while motivated ones will choose (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ). Hence, we derived the lower bound for the
payo¤ that borrowers can reach in equilibrium in our setting with heterogeneous lenders (see Proposition
5 of Maskin and Tirole 1992). To sum up:
Lemma 1 (i) The RSW allocation which takes into account market segmentation strictly dominates the
RSW allocation that ignores market segmentation. (ii) The equilibrium outcome is such that standard
borrowers sign the second-best contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ) with standard banks, whereas motivated borrowers sign
with ethical banks the third-best contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ): Such equilibrium outcome guarantees the lowest
payo¤ that both borrowers can reach in the credit market with standard and ethical banks.
Again, notice that the menu o¤ered to ethical banks in equilibrium is not unique because of the latent
contract (B110 ; I
1
10 ): As mentioned before, the latter can be substituted with any other contract that
signed by standard or by motivated borrowers assures non-negative prots to ethical banks.
16 In the end of Appendix 6.3, we also show that the RSW allocation in Denition 2 is Pareto superior to the allocation
derived from a program similar to RSW het but where the standard borrowers incentive constraint is satised so that
standard borrowers behave in

SShet
0=1

.
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In the following lemma we characterize contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) belonging to the equilibrium allocation
with market segmentation:
Lemma 2 The third-best contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) is such that B
1
11 > B
0
00 > B
1
11 and I
1
11 > I
1
11 > I
0
00 :
Proof. See the Appendix 6.3.
Hence, when  , the goodborrowers must pay the cost of separating from the badborrowers
and sign a contract which is worse than the second-best one because it entails a lower expected payment
and a lower investment. We will comment on the properties of the equilibrium outcome after Proposition
3 in the following Section.
4.2 Uniqueness and e¢ ciency
From Corollary to Proposition 3 of Maskin and Tirole (1992), we know that the RSW allocation (with
homogeneous agents) is interim e¢ cient for a non-empty set of beliefs. From the Corollary to Theorem
1 we also know that, if the RSW allocation is interim e¢ cient, then it is the unique equilibrium. If it
is not, then a multiplicity of equilibria exists in the form of a continuum of Pareto superior separating
allocations with cross-subsidies.
Importantly, as we will explain, cross-subsidies between di¤erent menus are not feasible in our setting
so that we are able to show some interesting new result about uniqueness. We rst prove that the alloca-
tion with market segmentation given by (B111 ; I
1
11 ) and (B
0
00 ; I
0
00 ) is the unique equilibrium outcome of
the contract proposal game. Then we derive conditions assuring that, given the bankspriors (q; 1  q),
the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is also interim e¢ cient.
In our setting we must distinguish between interim e¢ ciency when considering cross-subsidies between
contracts o¤ered to ethical and to standard banks and when considering cross-subsidies between contracts
o¤ered to ethical bank only. We thus dene:
Denition 3 Interim E¢ ciency. (i) The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Uncon-
strained Interim E¢ cient if no separating contracts protable in expectation exist that are preferred
by both borrowers types when cross subsidies between ethical and standard banks are considered. (ii)
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Constrained Interim E¢ cient if no separat-
ing contracts protable in expectation exist that are preferred by both borrowers types when only cross
subsidies between contracts nanced by ethical banks are considered.
Notice that Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency is a more demanding criterion than Constrained Interim
E¢ ciency. Intuitively, a larger set of allocations that break-even in expectation is available when cross-
subsidies between ethical and standard banks are possible than when only cross-subsidies inside ethical
banks are admitted.17
17Uniqueness follows from the observation below. An equilibrium allocation must be incentive compatible and, from
Corollary 1 (part (ii)), must weakly Pareto-dominate the equilibrium allocation given by (B111 ; I
1
11 ) and (B
0
00 ; I
0
00 ).
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Because, in the second stage, banks only accept menus that guarantee nonnegative expected prots,
we state that:
Remark 3 In third-best, at the equilibrium, only cross-subsidies between contracts o¤ered in the menu
designed for ethical banks are possible.
In fact, in the case where cross-subsidies among banks were implemented, the menu designed for
standard banks would contain a pooling contract that leads to negative prots to be covered with positive
prots earned by ethical banks in the other menu. But the menu for standard lenders would not be
accepted in the second stage of the Contract Proposal Game. We conclude that each menu must be
feasible (in isolation) for the banks.
Below we show that, in the menu o¤ered to ethical banks, feasible contracts with cross-subsidies that
Pareto-dominate the allocation with market segmentation do not exist.
Proposition 2 Uniqueness. (i) The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is always Con-
strained Interim E¢ cient. (ii) The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is unique.
Proof. (i) See the Appendix 6.4. (ii) It directly follows from (i):
In order to verify whether Pareto dominating contracts with cross-subsidies nanced by ethical banks
exist (point (i)), we must consider two programs with ethical bank as the lender. In the rst program (see
Program 15 in Appendix 2) we derive the expected prots of the ethical bank when it signs a contract with
the standard borrower which entails the second-best expected prots, pHB000 ; plus a transfer T (the latter
assures that the contract is Pareto improving for standard borrowers). From such a contract the ethical
bank earns negative prots which must be nanced by a protable contract (B1

11 ; I
1
11 ) that motivated
borrowers prefer to (B111 ; I
1
11 ): Thus, in the second step, we verify whether the Pareto improving new
contract (B1

11 ; I
1
11 ) is protable enough to cover the loss on bad borrowers (see Program 17 in Appendix
2). Intuitively Pareto-improving contracts do not exist because, given the lower expected return of ethical
projects, meeting expected prots pHB000 is too costly for the ethical bank.
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is characterized in the Proposition below which
incorporates results from Remark 2 and Lemma 2.
Proposition 3 Third-best. Considering the threshold values  >     0;
 when   , standard borrowers sign the second-best contract (B000 ; I000 ) with standard lenders.
Motivated borrowers sign with ethical banks the third-best contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) which is characterized
by lower revenue and investment than their second-best contract, but higher investment than the
second-best contract of standard borrowers. The credit market is fully segmented.
However, it cannot strictly Pareto-dominate such allocation if the latter is interim e¢ cient and so it must yield the same
payo¤s to the borrowers in this case.
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 When 

   , standard borrowers sign the second-best contract (B000 ; I000 ) with standard
lenders. Motivated borrowers sign the second-best contract (B111 ; I
1
11 ) with ethical banks. The credit
market is fully segmented.
 When  < ; then both borrowers types sign the second-best contract (B000 ; I000 ) with standard
banks. Ethical banks are not active and the market for ethical projects does not exist.
When  < , neither the market for ethical projects nor ethical banks exist because all borrowers
invest in standard projects. Whereas, for   , ethical banks are active and the market is fully
segmented as in the second-best. More specically, when 

  < ; the second-best contracts
are envy free. Instead, when   , standard borrowers are willing to mimic motivated ones to
receive better loan conditions and the menu that borrowers o¤er to ethical banks must satisfy the self-
selecting constraint of standard borrowers. As a result, motivated borrowers pay the cost of separation
and sign with ethical banks a contract entailing a higher investment
 
I000 < I
1
11

but a lower expected
revenue (B000 > B
1
11 ) than the ones characterizing contracts signed by standard borrowers and standard
lenders.18 This proves that, in third-best, the benet arising from trading between social responsible
agents is partially o¤set by the information rent appropriated by standard borrowers. However, the cost
of separation would be higher if ethical banks were the unique type of lenders in the credit market (see
Lemma 1) and no market segmentation was possible.
In order to verify whether the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is also Unconstrained
Interim E¢ cient, we consider now cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks.
Proposition 4 Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency. A su¢ cient condition such that the equilibrium
with market segmentation is Unconstrained Interim E¢ ciency is q < 12 .
Proof. See Appendix 6.5.
The proof of Proposition 4 is built as follows. In order to verify whether Pareto dominating contracts
with cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks exist, we proceed again in two steps. First, we
characterize the prot maximizing contract for a standard bank when the latter sign with the standard
borrower a contract entailing the second-best expected prots, pHB000 ; plus a transfer T to the borrower.
Such a transfer now must be paid by ethical banks to standard ones. Cross subsidization between di¤erent
lenders is possible if the ethical bank earns positive prots on an alternative contract (B1

11 ; I
1
11 ) (solving
Program 20 in Appendix 6.5) that motivated borrowers prefer to (B111 ; I
1
11 ): Thus, in the second step,
we must verify whether the Pareto improving new contract (B1

11 ; I
1
11 ) is protable enough to cover the
transfer T to be paid to standard lenders. In appendix 6.5 we show that, for q < 1=2; this is impossible
and hence no Pareto improving contract with cross-subsidy between di¤erent lenders exists. The intuition
for this result is straightforward: cross-subsidized contracts are feasible if  T (1  q) + qE111  0; where
18Notice that the same relationship between equilibrium contracts exists in the second-best for      (see
Proposition 1).
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E111 is ethical banksexpected prots from contract (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ): Obviously, a low percentage of motivated
borrowers in the population (or a low value of q) is not compatible with the feasibility of cross-subsidized
contracts.
Since the condition is su¢ cient but not necessary, larger values of q are still compatible with Uncon-
strained Interim E¢ ciency. However, when q becomes su¢ ciently larger than 1=2; then the equilibrium
allocation with market segmentation is not interim e¢ cient anymore and Pareto-dominating allocations
with cross-subsidies from ethical to standard banks exist.19 As explained before, a decentralized economy
is not able to implement such Pareto-improving allocations because they imply cross-subsidies between
di¤erent menus, i.e. they require menus that are not feasible in isolation and thus are not chosen by
lenders in the second stage of the Contract Proposal Game. However, in principle the government could
intervene to restore e¢ ciency by imposing taxes to ethical banks to be used to partially nance commer-
cial banks. Nevertheless, the political support for such a policy would reasonably be extremely low! In
fact, ethical banks are sacricing prots in the social interest by nancing projects which provide positive
externalities to people and communities whereas commercial banks are maximizing their prots investing
in projects generating high expected returns and no positive externalities.
5 Conclusion
In our model two di¤erent credit markets exist: the market for standard projects and the market for
ethical ones. We dene ethical projects those projects with both social and economic protability but
with a lower expected revenue with respect to standard ones. We model ethical banks as lenders which
are able to commit to nancing only ethical projects so that they are not interested in operating in the
markets for standard projects. Motivated borrowers obtain a non-monetary benet (a premium for social
responsibility) when they undertake ethical projects and also an additional benet from trading with
ethical banks in the case their project is successful. This implies that motivated borrowers prefer to
trade with ethical banks as long as the contract conditions are not too unfavorable with respect to those
obtained with standard lenders.
We investigate how ethical banks and motivated borrowers interact together when credit markets
are competitive and also standard banks and standard borrowers are active. When moral hazard is the
unique market failure, we showed in a previous paper that the matching of ethical lenders with motivated
borrowers reduces the frictions caused by moral-hazard and makes motivated borrowers better o¤: not
only they receive the premium for corporate social responsibility but they may also obtain better contract
conditions, in terms of larger loans and higher expected returns, than standard borrowers.
However, when no credible commitment to borrowerssocial responsibility exists and motivated en-
trepreneurs receive a better prospect, then standard entrepreneurs have interest in mimicking social
19Those allocations entail a payo¤ for motivated borrowers that is in between the minimum payo¤ obtained with contract
(B111 ; I
1
11 ) and the maximum one implied by (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ).
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responsibility by investing in ethical projects in order to obtain the dominating contract. This is the
setting we study in the present paper: we solve the Contract Proposal Game where informed borrowers
o¤er (possibly separating) contracts to ethical and standard banks. We contribute to the literature on
Informed Principals because, in our setting, agents are heterogeneous and, as a consequence, principals
o¤er multiple menus.
We show that (i) in the Contract Proposal Game with heterogeneous lenders, the equilibrium al-
location entails full market segmentation and is characterized by two contracts picked from di¤erent
menus. (ii) The menu o¤ered to ethical banks contains the RSW allocation with market segmentation in
which motivated borrowers pay the cost of separation from standard entrepreneurs and lose their higher
expected returns. (iii) The coexistence of standard and ethical banks in the credit market improves
e¢ ciency because the RSW allocation with market segmentation dominates the one with homogeneous
lenders. This means that the e¢ ciency-loss caused by adverse selection would be higher in a credit
market with homogeneous banks. (iv) The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is always
unique. (v) If the share of motivated borrowers in the population of entrepreneurs is less than 50%, then
the equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is (Unconstrained) Interim E¢ cient.
In a nutshell, our model shows that market segmentation improves e¢ ciency and solves the problem
of multiplicity of equilibria in Contract Proposal Games.
6 Appendix
6.1 Second-best contracts
The net present value of both projects (ethical and non-ethical) is positive if the borrower behaves and
negative otherwise. Hence, the investment cannot be implemented, in either standard or ethical projects,
if it is not possible to address the moral hazard problem:
pHR > 1 (5)
pLR+ P < 1: (6)
Moreover, the expected prot of both standard and socially responsible lenders must be non-negative.
The two lendersparticipation constraints
 
IRL0j

and
 
IRL1j

, thus correspond to:
pHLij  Iij  A
or:
pHRIij   Iij +A  pHBij (7)
As illustrated in Barigozzi and Tedeschi (2015), the problem of a borrower contracting a loan for a
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standard project with a standard lender is:
max
B000;I
0
00
pHB
0
00  A
s:t: B000  PI
0
00
p
 
ICB000
 
pHR
0   1 I000   pHB000 +A  0  IRL000 
(8)
where
 
ICB000

is the incentive compatibility constraint for a standard borrower trading with a standard
bank for a standard project and
 
IRL000

is the participation constraint of the standard lender. The
solution is contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ) such that:
I000 =
A
1  pH

R0   Pp

B000 =
P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 = PI000
p
(9)
The program of a motivated borrower contracting for an ethical project with an ethical bank is very
similar to (8); in particular, R1 must replace R0 and the incentive constraint ICB111 ; illustrated in Section
3, must replace ICB000 . The solution is contract (B
1
11 ; I
1
11 ); such that:
I111 =
A+ pH
1  pH

R1   Pp

B111 =
P
p
A+ pH
1  pH

R1   Pp
   = P
p
I111   (10)
The three threshold values appearing in Proposition 1 are:


 max

0;  
p
p2HP

1  pH

R1   P
p



 
 
R0  R1 I000
  pHP
p
 
R0  R1 I000
pHR1   1 =
pHB
0
00
pHR1   1
 
R0  R1 (11)
6.2 Pooling contract
The pooling contract that motivated borrowers propose to ethical banks, if they are not willing to pay
the cost of separation from standard borrowers, can be dened as follows:
Denition 4 Suppose that motivated borrowers propose a pooling contract
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

to ethical banks.
The pooling contract solves:
max
B11j ;I
1
1j
pHB
1
1j + pH +   A
s:t: B11j 
P
p
I11j
 
ICB10

 
pHR
S1   1 I11j   pHB11j +A  0  IRL11j 
(Pooling Contract)
or it satises the standard borrowersincentive constraint and the participation constraint of ethical banks.
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Remember that, when the incentive constraint of standard borrowers holds, a fortiori the incentive
constraint of motivated borrowers is satised. Moreover, it can be easily shown (see Barigozzi and Tedeschi
2015) that the sum of the two premia for social responsibility pH+ appearing in the objective function
of (Pooling Contract), but not in the incentive compatibility constraint ICB10, does not a¤ect the optimal
contract. Thus, contract (B110 ; I
1
10 ) (considered in Denition 1) and
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

are equivalent.
Standard borrowers will never choose the pooling contract
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

because they strictly prefer
the second-best contract (B000 ; I
0
00 ). Moreover,
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

does not make use of the relaxed incentive
constraint (ICB11) that allows to reduce agency costs for motivated borrowers (who would be the only
ones to possibly choose contract
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

). Thus, the separating allocations analyzed in the main text
strictly dominate the pooling contract solving Program Pooling Contract.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
In order to characterize contract
 
B111 ; I
1
11

in the RSW allocation with market segmentation, we have
to solve the following problem of a representative motivated borrower:
max
B111;I
1
11
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 + 
P
p
I111
 
ICB11

 
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A  0  IRL11
pHB
0
00  pLB111 + PI111

SShet0=1

(12)
Notice that SShet0=1 must be binding, otherwise the second-best program, which is not feasible by assump-
tion, would be reached; in fact, for   ; the standard borrower prefers the motivated borrowers
contract. Hence
pHB
0
00 = pLB
1
11 + PI
1
11
The three constraints in Program 12 can be rewritten as:
I111 
p
P
B111 +
p
P

 
ICB11

I111 
pHB
1
11  A
pHR1   1
 
IRL11

I111 
pH
P
B000  
pL
P
B111

SShet0=1
 (13)
In the space
 
B111; I
1
11

the boundary of the sets are straight lines. That of SShet0=1 is negatively sloped
while those of the other two are positively sloped. In particular, the lines dened by ICB11 and IR
L
11 have
positive and a negative intercept, respectively. We are going to prove that the three linear constraints are
compatible with each other and, in the set of feasible allocations, we will nd out which one maximizes
the motivated borrowers payo¤.
Suppose that ICB11 is binding and hence holds with equality. Then substituting IC
B
11 into SS
het
0=1
(which is binding) we obtain:
pHB
0
00 = pL

P
p
I111  

+ PI111 =

pL
p
+ 1

PI111   pL =
pH
p
PI111   pL:
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Using the previous equation to derive I111 and substituting the expression for B
0
00 , we obtain an explicit
expression for I111 :
I111 =
p
P
B000 +
p
P
pL
pH
 =
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + p
P
pL
pH

We substitute the expression for I111 back into IC
B
11 to obtain the motivated borrowers income in the
point where ICB11 and SS
het
0=1 cross each other:
B111 =
P
p
0@ A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + p
P
pL
pH

1A 
=
P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
   p
pH

We now must check whether the participation constraint of the lender is satised for the values of B111
and I111 just derived. By substituting those values into IR
L
11 we obtain: 
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A =
 pH R
0  R1
1 + Pp pH   pHR0
A+
 
pHR
1   1 p
P
pL
pH
 +p
which must be non-negative. Thus, IRL11 is satised if: 
pHR
1   1 p
P
pL
pH
 +p  ApH R
0  R1
1 + Pp pH   pHR0
(14)
Recall that we are considering the case where   : From (11) we know that:
 =
pHP
p
 
R0  R1 I000
pHR1   1 =
pHP
p
 
R0  R1
pHR1   1
A
1  pH

R0   Pp

Because the l.h.s of (14) is increasing in , a su¢ cient condition for IRL11 to be satised is that inequality
(14) holds when substituting  in the place of : 
pHR
1   1 p
P
pL
pH
pHP
p
 
R0  R1
pHR1   1
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
+
pHP
 
R0  R1
pHR1   1
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 
ApH
R0  R1
1 + Pp pH   pHR0
which boils down into
pHP
pHR1   1  pH   pL = p
22
or
pH
P
p
   pHR1   1 = 1 + P
p
pH   pHR1  0
which is certainly true, being the previous expression the denominator of (10). Hence, the constraint
IRL11 is satised implying that the two constraints, IR
L
11 and IC
B
11 are compatible with each other. That
is, IRL11 (taken with equality) crosses SS
het
0=1 at a lower investment level, I
1
11, and (more importantly)
at a bigger borrowers revenue, B111, with respect to IC
B
11 (again taken with equality). This means
that the solution where IRL11 and SS
het
0=1 cross each other is characterized by the highest B
1
11, in the
intersection of all constraints. As can be checked in the following gure, the feasible allocations are inside
the three straight lines representing the three constraints and the motivated borrowers expected revenue
is maximized in the intersection of IRL11 and SS
B
0 .
Insert Figure 1 here
The point where IRL11 crosses SS
het
0=1 is characterized by the system24  pHR1   1  pH
P pL
3524 I111
B111
35 =
24  A
pHB
0
00
35
with solutions:
I111 =
p2HB
0
00   pLA
pL (pHR1   1) + pHP
B111 =
 
pHR
1   1 pHB000 +AP
pL (pHR1   1) + pHP
Substituting the value of B000 we obtain:
B111 =
pL
 
pHR
1   1+ pHP  ppH  R0  R1
pL (pHR1   1) + pHP
P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp

I111 =
pL
 
pHR
1   1+ pHP + pLpH  R0  R1
pL (pHR1   1) + pHP
A
1  pH

R0   Pp

Note that B111 and I
1
11 do not depend on  and, by comparison with expressions in Appendix 6.1,
they are such that B111 < B
0
00 and I
1
11 > I
0
00 : Moreover, for    and B111 > B000 , we have that
B111 > B
0
00 > B
1
11 : Finally, we showed before that the third-best contract is at the intersection between
SShet0=1 and IR
L
11. The second-best contract is instead at the intersection between IC
B
11 and, again, IR
L
11.
Since IRL11 and SS
het
0=1 are positively and negatively sloped (see Figure 1), respectively, it must be true
that the level of investment in the third best is lower than in the second best, I111 < I
1
11 .
We proved that, at the solution of Program 12, the incentive constraint ICB11 is slack. One may then
wonder whether the solution to a program where the incentive constraint of the standard (instead of the
motivated) borrower is satised and where, in the self-selection constraint SS0=1; the mimicker behaves
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(instead of misbehaving), is Pareto-superior to the allocation we just derived. To see that, let us consider
the following program:
max
B111;I
1
11
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 
P
p
I111
 
ICB11

 
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A  0  IRL11
pHB
0
00  pHB111
 
SS0=1

The answer is not. Indeed, the previous program is mathematically equivalent to the Pooling Contract
analyzed in Appendix 6.2, which delivers the Pareto-dominated pooling solution
 
B11j ; I
1
1j

:
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Constrained Interim E¢ cient if a pair of Pareto
dominating contracts nanced by ethical banks and feasible in expectation does not exist.
First step. We will derive the expected prots of an ethical bank as a function of T; where T is
the standard borrowersrent above their expected utility pHB000 ; in a candidate equilibrium with cross
subsidy:
max
B110(T );I
1
10(T )
 
pHR
1   1 I110 (T )  pHB110 (T ) +A
st: B110 (T ) 
P
p
I110 (T ) (IC
1
10)
pHB
1
10 (T )  pH
P
p
A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 + T (PC110)
(15)
PC110 indicates that the new contract
 
B110 (T ) ; I
1
10(T )

implies, for standard borrowers, a gain of T over
the expected payo¤ obtained with (B000 ; I
0
00 ); where B
0
00 =
P
p
A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 :
The participation constraint PC110 of the standard borrower must be binding. If not, the standard
lender could decrease B110 (T ) and increase prots. By substituting PC
1
10 taken with equality into the
objective function, the program becomes:
max
 
pHR
1   1 I110 (T ) + 1 pHR0
1 pH

R0  Pp
A  T
st: B110 (T ) 
P
p
I110 (T ) (IC
1
10)
The objective function is thus increasing in I110. Hence, also the incentive compatibility constraint IC
1
10
has to be binding. As a consequence, we can study Program (15) with both constraints binding. From
the PC110:
B110 (T ) =
P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + T
pH
and substituting B110 (T ) into IC
1
10 we nd:
I110 (T ) =
p
P
B110 (T ) =
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + p
PpH
T
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Now we can replace the expressions for B110 (T ) and I
1
10 (T ) into the objective function of the ethical bank
to derive its (maximized) expected payo¤ as a function of the transfer T :
L1 (T ) =  
p
P
T
pH

1  pH

R1   P
p

  pH
 
R0  R1A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 (16)
Thus, L1 (T ) < 0 8T and L1 (T ) =   pH(R0 R1)A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 < 0 if T = 0. Prots L1 (T ) are decreasing in T:
In words, ethical banks always earn negative prots (also if T = 0) when o¤ering to standard borrowers
an expected payo¤ pHB110 (T )  pHB000 + T: In fact R0 > R1 and the best contract that ethical banks
can o¤er to standard borrowers is always dominated (i.e. B110 < B
0
00 holds), independently from the
magnitude of the transfer T: This implies that ethical banks need very high prots from motivated
borrowers to cover losses from contract
 
B110 (T ) ; I
1
10(T )

:
Second step. The transfer T can be o¤ered to standard borrowers only if ethical banks earn positive
prots on motivated borrowers. We have to solve a program where motivated borrowers o¤er a contract
to ethical banks subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of motivated borrowers ICB11, the self-
selection constraint SST0=1 and the participation constraint for ethical banks
fIRL11.
max
B111;I
1
11;T
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 +  PI
1
11
p
 
ICB11
  
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A q
 

p
P
T
pH

1  pH

R1   Pp

+
pH(R0 R1)A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 (1  q)  0
fIRL11
pHB
0
00 + T  pLB111 + PI111

SST0=1

(17)
In fIRL11, ethical banks must earn positive prots from the fraction q of motivated borrowers in order to
cover the expenditure of providing T to the 1   q standard borrowers. The expression for the expected
prots L1 (T ) just derived before in (16) has been substituted in fIRL11.
Let us focus on the three constraints of the previous program when T = 0 :
B111 +  PI
1
11
p
 
ICB11
 
(pHR1   1) I111   pHB111 +A

q   pH(R
0 R1)A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 (1  q)  0 fIRL11
pHB
0
00  pLB111 + PI111

SShet0=1

The system taken with equality is:
I111 =
p
P B
1
11 +
p
P 
 
ICB11

I111 =
pH(R0 R1)
q(pHR1 1)

1 pH

R0  Pp
A  ApHR1 1 + pHpHR1 1B111
fIRL11
I111 =
pH
p
A
1 pH

R0  Pp
   pLB111P

SShet0=1
 (18)
By comparing system (18) with system (13) analyzed in the proof of Lemma (2), we observe that the only
di¤erence is in fIRL11, which now has the same slope but a higher intercept. In particular the intercept
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is now larger of the term
pH(R0 R1)
q(pHR1 1)

1 pH

R0  Pp
A > 0: This implies that the line depicted by fIRL11
shifts on the left with respect to the one depicted by IRL11 and illustrated in Figure 1.
We need now to understand whether fIRL11 crosses ICB11 on the left or on the right of the intercept
between ICB11 and SS
het
0=1: To do so let us rst calculate B
SS
IC ; that is B
1
11 in the intercept between IC
B
11
and SShet0=1 :
p
P
B111 +
p
P
 =
pH
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
   pLB111
P
that is:
BSSIC =
ApH
P
p
 p

1  pH

R0   Pp

pH

1  pH

R0   Pp

Let us now calculate BfIRIC ; that is B111 in the intercept between ICB11 and fIRL11:
p
P
B111 +
p
P
 =
pH
 
R0  R1  q 1  pH R1   Pp
q (pHR1   1)

1  pH

R0   Pp
 A+ B111pH
pHR1   1
that is:
B
fIR
IC =
P
p
 
pHR
1   1
1 + Pp pH   pHR1
0@
P
p +

1  pH

R1   Pp

q   pH
 
R0  R1
q (pHR1   1)

1  pH

R0   Pp
 A
1A
We can easily check that BSSIC > B
fIR
IC implying that fIRL11 crosses ICB11 on the left of the intercept
between ICB11 and SS
het
0=1: In fact:
BSSIC BfIRIC = p

1  pH

R0   Pp
  
p
 
pHR
1   1+ pH  1  pHR1   P  q + p2H  R0  R1AP
qpHp

1  pH

R0   Pp

1  pH

R1   Pp
 > 0
The previous inequality takes into account that
p
 
pHR
1   1+ pH  1  pHR1   P  > 0
because
p
 
pHR
1   1+ pH  1  pHR1   P  =
(pH   pL)
 
pHR
1   1+ pH  1  pHR1   P  =
pL   pH
 
P + pLR
1

>
pL   pL
 
P + pLR
1

= pL
 
1  P   pLR1

> 0
which comes from the ine¢ ciency of misbehaving.
All this proves that, when T = 0; the constraints of system 18 can be depicted as in Figure 2 below. In
particular, ICB11 and fIRL11 cross each other before reaching SShet0=1. Then the highest payo¤ for motivated
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borrowers is obtained at the intersection between ICB11 and fIRL11; where B111 is at the highest value
compatible with the three constraints.
Insert Figure 2 here
Notice that only fIRL11 depends on T: In particular, for T > 0; fIRL11 can be re-written as:
I111  pHB
1
11 A
pHR1 1 +
p
P
T
pH
1 pH

R1  Pp

pHR1 1
1 q
q +
pH(R0 R1)A
1 pH

R0  Pp

(pHR1 1)
1 q
q
Starting from T = 0 and by increasing T , the intercept rises but the slope is unchanged. Hence, by
increasing T , fIRL11 shifts even more on the left. As a consequence, the optimal B111 moves left along ICB11
and therefore decreases.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium allocation with market segmentation is Unconstrained Interim E¢ cient if a pair of Pareto
dominating contracts with cross-subsidies between ethical and standard banks does not exist.
First step. We will derive the expected prots of a standard bank as a function of T; where T is the
standard borrowersrent above their expected utility pHB000 ; in an allocation with cross subsidy:
max
B000(T );I
0
00(T )
 
pHR
0   1 I000 (T )  pHB000 (T ) +A
st: B000 (T ) 
P
p
I000 (T ) (IC
0
00)
pHB
0
00 (T )  pH
P
p
A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 + T (PC000)
(19)
The right hand side of PC000 indicates that the new contract
 
B000 (T ) ; I
0
00(T )

implies, for standard
borrowers, a gain of T over the expected payo¤ obtained with (B000 ; I
0
00 ); where B
0
00 =
P
p
A
1 pH

R0  Pp
 :
The participation constraint PC000 of the standard borrower must be binding. If not, the standard
lender could decrease B000 (T ) and increase prots. By substituting PC
0
00 taken with equality into the
objective function, the program becomes:
max
 
pHR
0   1 I000 (T ) + 1 pHR0
1 pH

R0  Pp
A  T
st: B000 (T ) 
P
p
I000 (T ) (IC
0
00)
The objective function is thus increasing in I000. Hence, also the incentive compatibility constraint IC
0
00
has to be binding. As a consequence, we can study Program (19) with both constraints binding. From
the PC000:
B000 (T ) =
P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + T
pH
and substituting B000 (T ) into IC
0
00 we nd:
I000 (T ) =
p
P
B000 (T ) =
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + p
PpH
T
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Now we can replace the expressions for B000 (T ) and I
0
00 (T ) into the objective function of the lender to
derive its (maximized) expected payo¤ as a function of the transfer T :
L0 (T ) =
 
pHR
0   1 p
P
0@ P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + T
pH
1A+
 pH
0@ P
p
A
1  pH

R0   Pp
 + T
pH
1A+A
=  p
P
T
pH

1  pH

R0   P
p

Thus, L0 (T ) < 0 if T > 0 and L0 (T ) = 0 if T = 0. As expected, the standard bank earns negative
prots when o¤ering the transfer T to the standard borrower.
Second step. The transfer T can be o¤ered to standard borrowers if ethical banks pay for it. In
turn, ethical banks can a¤ord to pay for T only if they earn positive prots on motivated borrowers.
In order to verify whether Pareto improving contracts with cross-subsidy between banks are feasible, we
have to solve the following program where motivated borrowers o¤er a contract to ethical banks subject
to the incentive compatibility constraint ICB11 and the self-selection constraint SS
T
0=1: Moreover, now the
transfer T must enter the participation constraint for ethical banks:
max
B111;I
1
11;T
pHB
1
11 + pH +   A
s:t: B111 +  PI
1
11
p
 
ICB11
  
pHR
1   1 I111   pHB111 +A q
 pP TpH

1  pH

R0   Pp

(1  q)  0
 
IRL11

pHB
0
00 + T  pLB111 + PI111

SST0=1

(20)
notice that, in IRL11, ethical banks must earn positive prots from the fraction q of motivated borrowers
in order to cover the expenditure of providing T to the 1  q standard borrowers. The expression for the
expected prots L0 (T ) just derived before has been substituted in IR
L
11.
In the main text of Subsection 4.2, the solution to Program 20 has been called (B1

11 ; I
1
11 ).
We know that the solution when T = 0 (derived in Lemma 2) lies in the intersection between IRL11
and SShet0=1  SST0=1

T=0
. We want to check conditions such that a marginal transfer T; paid to stan-
dard borrowers, makes the expected prots of motivated borrowers decrease, or such that the derivative
dB111
dT

T=0
is negative. However, since the transfer T enters both constraints IRL11 and SS
T
0=1 in a linear
way, the derivative dB
1
11
dT does not depend on the magnitude of T as long as the solution remains in the
intersection between RL11 and SS
T
0=1:
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By totally di¤erentiating IRL11 and SS
T
0=1 we obtain:24    pHR1   1 pH
 P  pL
35 d
24 I111
B111
35 =
24   pPpH 1  pH R0   Pp (1 q)q
 1
35 dT
Hence:
dB111
dT
=
pH(pHR1 1)q (pH pL)

1 pH

R0  P
(pH pL)

(1 q)
pH(PpH+(pHR1 1)pL)q
Therefore dB
1
11
dT < 0 if and only if
q <
1
pH(pHR1 1)
(pH pL)

1 pH

R0  P
(pH pL)
 + 1 = q
and since one can check that
(pH   pL)

1  pH

R0   P
(pH   pL)

> pH
 
pHR
1   1 ;
it must be q > 12 . Thus, q <
1
2 is a su¢ cient condition for
dB111
dT < 0: We can conclude that, when
the solution is in the intersection between RL11 and SS
T
0=1 and q <
1
2 ; the separating allocation with
cross-subsidy is not welfare improving because motivated borrowers are worse o¤. It remains to see what
happens when T increases so much that the solution is no more in the intersection between RL11 and
SST0=1: The three constraints appearing in Program 20 can be rewritten as:
I111  pP B111 + pP 
 
ICB11

I111  pHB
1
11 A
pHR1 1 +
p
P
T
pH
1 pH

R0  Pp

pHR1 1
(1 q)
q
 
IRL11

I111  pHP B000   pLP B111 + TP

SST0=1

As T increases, the line of the SST0=1 constraint in Figure 1 moves up, while the line of IR
L
11 moves left.
Instead, ICB11 does not move. Hence, for T su¢ ciently big, SS
T
0=1 becomes irrelevant and the optimal
contract lies on the intersection between ICB11 and IR
L
11. However, for a continuity argument, it would
still be true that dB
1
11
dT < 0. In fact IC
B
11 is unchanged, IR
L
11 moves left, and we showed before that
dB111
dT < 0 for smaller values of T:
We can conclude that, by increasing the transfer T; the expected payo¤ of motivated borrowers always
decreases and, thus, no protable pair of contracts with cross-subsidies exists.
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Figure 2. Separating contracts with cross-subsidies: the new 
participation constraint of ethical banks.  
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Figure 1. The RSW allocation with market segmentation: the 
three constraints appearing in Program RSWhet of Definition 2.  
 
 
